Chapter 18: Private Property, Public Purpose(*)
The socialists and communists propose to cure poverty by seizing
private property, particularly property in the means of production, and turning
it over to be operated by the government.
What the advocates of all expropriation schemes fail to realize is that
property in private hands used for the production of goods and services for the
market is already for all practical purposes public wealth. It is serving the
public just as much as -- in fact, far more effectively than -- if it were owned and
operated by the government.
Suppose that a single rich man were to invest his capital in a railroad owned
by himself alone. He could not use this merely to transport his own family and
their personal goods. That would be ruinously wasteful. If he wished to make a
profit on his investment, he would have to use his railroad to transport the
public and their goods. He would have to devote his railroad to a public use.
And unlike a government agency, the private owner is obliged by
self-preservation to try to avoid losses, which means that he is forced to run
his railroad economically and efficiently. And also unlike a government agency,
the private capitalist is nearly always obliged to face competition -- which means
to make the services he provides or the goods he sells superior or at least
equal to those provided by his competitors. Therefore the private capitalist
normally serves the public far better than the government could if it took over
his property. Looked at from the standpoint of the service they provide, the
private railroads today are worth vastly more to the public than to their
owners.
Though socialists chronically fail to understand it, there is nothing
original in the theme just stated. It was hinted at in Adam Smith:
"Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own
advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society." (1)
At another point Adam Smith was even more explicit:
Every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every
frugal man a public benefactor. ... The principle which prompts to save, is
the desire of bettering our condition... . An augmentation of fortune is the
means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their
condition. ... [A]nd the most likely way of augmenting their fortune, is to
save and accumulate some part of what they acquire .... [The funds they
accumulate] are destined for the maintenance of productive labor....
The productive powers of the same number of laborers cannot be increased, but
in consequence either of some addition and improvement to those machines and
instruments which facilitate and abridge labor; or of a more proper division
and distribution of employment. In either case an additional capital is almost
always required. (2)
In the history of economic thought, however, it is
astonishing how much this truth was neglected or forgotten, even by some of
Smith's most eminent successors. But the theorem has been revived, and some of
its corollaries more explicitly examined, by several writers in the present
century.
How Henry Ford Profitably Served the Public
One of them was George E. Roberts, director of the U. S. Mint
under three Presidents, who was responsible for the Monthly Economic Letter of
the National City Bank of New York from 1914 until 1940.
An example often cited by Roberts was Henry Ford and his
automobile plant. Roberts pointed out in the July letter of 1918 that the
portion of the profits of Henry Ford's automobile business that he had invested
in the development and manufacture of a farm tractor was not devoted to Ford's
private wants; nor was that portion which he invested in furnaces for making
steel; nor that portion invested in workingmen's houses. "If Henry Ford had
exceptional talent for the direction of large productive enterprises the public
had no reason to regret that he had an income of $50,000,000 a year with which
to enlarge his operations. If that income came to him because he had a genius
for industrial management, the results to the public were probably larger than
they would have been if the $50,000,000 had been arbitrarily distributed at 50
cents per head to all the [then, 1918] population of the country."
In brief, only that portion of his income which the owner
spends upon himself and his dependents is devoted to him or to them. All the
rest is devoted to the public as completely as though the title of ownership was
in the state. The individual may toil, study, contrive, and save, but all that
he saves inures to others.
But the Ford Motor Company, from the profits of which the
original owner drew so little for his own personal needs, is not a unique
example in American business. Perhaps the greater part of private profits are
today reinvested in industry to pay for increased production and service for the
public.
Profits After Taxes Average 4 Percent of Sales
Let us see what happened, for example, to all the corporate
profits in the United States in 1968, 50 years after George Roberts was writing
about the Ford Company. These aggregate net profits amounted before taxes to a
total of $88.7 billion (or one-eighth of the total national income in that year
of $712.7 billion).
Out of these profits the corporations had to pay 46 percent,
or $40.6 billion, to the government in taxes. The public, of course, got
directly whatever benefit these provided. Corporate profits after taxes then
amounted to $48.2 billion, or less than 7 percent of the national income.
These profits after taxes, moreover, averaged only 4 cents
for every dollar of sales. This meant that for every dollar that the
corporations took in from sales, they paid out 96 cents -- partly for taxes, but
mainly for wages and for supplies from others.
But by no means all of the $48.2 billion earned after taxes
went to the stockholders of the corporations in dividends. More than half -- $24.9
billion -- was retained or reinvested in the business. Only $23.3 billion went to
the stockholders in dividends.
There is nothing untypical in these 1968 corporate
reinvestment figures. In every one of the six years preceding 1968 the amount of
funds retained for reinvestment exceeded the total amount paid out in dividends.
Moreover, even the $25 billion figure understates corporate
reinvestment in 1968. For in that year the corporations suffered $46.5 billion
depreciation on their old plant and equipment. Nearly all of this was reinvested
in repairs to old equipment or to complete replacement. The $24.9 billion
represented reinvestment of profits in additional or greatly improved
equipment.
And even the $23.3 billion that finally went to stockholders
was not all retained by them to be spent on their personal consumption. A great
deal of it was reinvested in new enterprises. The amount is not precisely
ascertainable; but the U. S. Department of Commerce estimates that total
personal savings in 1968 exceeded $40 billion.
Thus because of both corporate and personal saving, an
ever-increasing supply is produced of finished goods and services to be shared
by the American masses.
In a modern economy, in brief, those who save and invest can
hardly help but serve the public. As Mises has put it: "In the market
society the proprietors of capital and land can enjoy their property only by
employing it for the satisfaction of other people's wants. They must serve the
consumers in order to have any advantage from what is their own. The very fact
that they own means of production forces them to submit to the wishes of the
public. Ownership is an asset only for those who know how to employ it in the
best possible way for the benefit of the consumers. It is a social function." (3)
It follows from this that the rich can do the most good for
the poor if they refrain from ostentation and extravagance, and if instead they
save and invest their savings in industries producing goods for the masses.
F. A. Harper has gone so far as to write: "Both fact and
logic seem to me to support the view that savings invested in privately owned
economic tools of production amount to an act of charity. And further, I believe
it to be -- as a type -- the greatest economic charity of all." (4)
Professor Harper supports this view by quoting, among others,
from Samuel Johnson, who once said: "You are much surer that you are doing
good when you pay money to those who work, as a recompense of their
labor, than when you give money merely in charity." (5)
So, saving and sound investment are by far the most important
means by which the rich can confer benefits on the poor.
Saving and Investment
This theme has found expression in this century by a
deplorably small number of writers. One of the most persuasive was Hartley
Withers, a former editor of the famous London Economist, who published
an ingratiating little book in 1914, a few weeks before the outbreak of the
First World War, called Poverty and Waste.6
The contention of his book is that when a wealthy man spends money on
luxuries he causes the production of luxuries and so diverts capital, energy,
and labor from the production of necessaries, and so makes necessaries scarce
and dear for the poor. Withers does not ask him
... to give his money away, for he would probably do more
harm than good thereby, unless he did it very carefully and skillfully; but
only to invest part of what he now spends on luxuries so that more capital may
be available on luxuries so that more capital may be available for the output
of necessaries. So that by the simultaneous process of increasing the supply
of capital and diminishing the demand for luxuries the wages of the poor may
be increased and the supply of their needs may be cheapened; and he himself
may feel more comfortable in the enjoyment of his income. (7)
Yet in spite of the authority of the classical economists and
the inherent strength of the arguments for saving and investment, the gospel of
spending has an even older history. One of the chief tenets of the "new
economics" of our time is that saving is not only ridiculous but the chief cause
of depressions and unemployment.
Adam Smith's arguments for saving and investment were at
least partly a refutation of some of the mercantilist doctrines thriving in the
century before he wrote. Professor Eli Heckscher, in his Mercantilism (2
vol., 1935), quotes a number of examples of what he calls "the deep-rooted
belief in the utility of luxury and the evil of thrift." Thrift, in fact, was
regarded as the cause of unemployment, and for two reasons: in the first place,
because real income was believed to diminish by the amount of money which did
not enter into exchange, and secondly, because saving was believed to "withdraw
money from circulation." (8)
An example of how persistent these fallacies were, long after
Adam Smith's refutation, is found in the words that the sailor-turned-novelist,
Captain Marryat, put into the mouth of his hero, Mr. Midshipman Easy, in his
novel by that name published in 1836: "The luxury, the pampered state, the
idleness -- if you please, the wickedness -- of the rich, all contribute to the
support, the comfort, and the employment of the poor. You may behold
extravagance -- it is a vice; but that very extravagance circulates money, and the
vice of one contributes to the happiness of many. The only vice which is not
redeemed by producing commensurate good, is avarice."
Mr. Midshipman Easy is supposed to have learned this wisdom
in the navy, but it is almost an exact summary of the doctrine preached in
Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees in 1714.
Luxury Spending
Now though this doctrine is false in its attack on thrift,
there is an important germ of truth in it. The rich can hardly prevent
themselves from helping the poor to some extent, almost regardless of how they
spend or save their money. So far from the wealth of the rich being the cause of
the poverty of the poor, as the immemorial popular fallacy has it, the poor are
made less poor by their economic relations with the rich. Even if the rich spend
their money foolishly and wastefully, they give employment to the poor as
servants, as suppliers, even as panders to their vices. But what is too often
forgotten is that if the rich saved and invested their money they would not only
give employment to just as many people producing capital goods, but that as a
result of the reduced costs of production and the increased supply of consumer
goods which this investment brought about, the real wages of the workers and the
supply of goods and services available to them would greatly increase.
What is also forgotten by the defenders of luxury spending is
that, though it improves the condition of the poor who cater to it, it also
increases their dissatisfaction, unrest, and resentment. The result is increased
envy of, and sullenness toward, those who are making them better off.
The first eminent economist who attempted to refute Adam
Smith's proposition that "every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and
every frugal man a public benefactor" was Thomas R. Malthus. Malthus's objections
were partly well taken and partly fallacious. I have examined them rather fully
in another place; (9) and I shall content myself here with quoting a few lines from the answer that a greater economist than Malthus, David Ricardo, made at the time (circa 1814-21): "Mr. Malthus never appears to remember that to save is to spend, as surely as what he exclusively calls spending.... I deny that the wants of consumers generally are
diminished by parsimony -- they are transferred with the power to consume to another set of consumers." (10)
John Maynard Keynes
We have yet to discuss the views of the most influential
opponent of saving in our time -- John Maynard Keynes.
It is widely believed, especially by his disciples, that Lord
Keynes did not condemn saving until, in a sudden vision on his road to Damascus,
the truth flashed upon him and he published it in The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936. All this is apocryphal. Keynes
disparaged saving almost from the beginning of his career. He was warning his
countrymen in a broadcast address in January, 1931, that "whenever you save
five shillings, you put a man out of work for a day." And long before that, in
his Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in 1920, he was writing
passages like this:
The railways of the world which [the nineteenth century] built as a monument
to posterity, were, not less than the Pyramids of Egypt, the work of labor
which was not free to consume in immediate enjoyment the full equivalent of
its efforts.
Thus this remarkable system depended for its growth on a double bluff or
deception. On the one hand the laboring classes accepted from ignorance or
powerlessness, or were compelled, persuaded, or cajoled by custom, convention,
authority, and the well-established order of Society into accepting, a
situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they
and Nature and the capitalists were cooperating to produce. And on the other
hand the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake
theirs and were theoretically free to consume it, on the tacit underlying
condition that they consumed very little of it in practice. The duty of
"saving" became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the
object of true religion. There grew round the nonconsumption of the cake all
those instincts of puritanism which in other ages has withdrawn itself from
the world and has neglected the arts of production as well as those of
enjoyment. And so the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly
contemplated. Individuals would be exhorted not so much to abstain as to
defer, and to cultivate the pleasures of security and anticipation. Saving was
for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory -- the virtue of
the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your
children after you. (pp. 19-20)
This passage illustrates the irresponsible flippancy that
runs through so much of Keynes's work. It was clearly written tongue-in-cheek.
In the very next sentences Keynes made a left-handed retraction: "In
writing thus I do not necessarily disparage the practices of that generation. In
the unconscious recesses of its being Society knew what it was about," etc.
Yet he let his derision stand to do its harm.
If we accepted Keynes's original passage as sincerely
written, we would have to point out in reply: (1) The railways of the world
cannot be seriously compared with the pyramids of Egypt, because the railways
enormously improved the production, transportation, and availability of goods
and services for the masses. (2) There was no bluff and no deception. The
workers who built the railroads were perfectly "free to consume" in
immediate enjoyment the frill equivalent of their efforts. It was the capitalist
classes that did nearly all the saving, not the workers. (3) Even the
capitalist classes did consume most of their slice of the cake; they were
simply wise enough to refrain from consuming all of it in the same year
as they baked it.
This point is so fundamental, and both Keynes and his
disciples have so confused themselves and others with their mockery and
intellectual somersaults, that it is worth making the matter plain by
constructing an illustrative table.
Results in Ruritania: A Larger "Cake"
Let us assume that in Ruritania, as a result of net annual
saving and investment of 10 percent of output, there is over the long run an
average increase in real production of 3 percent a year. Then the picture of
economic growth we get over a ten-year period runs like this in terms of index
numbers:
Year |
Total Production |
Consumers' Goods |
Capital Goods |
First |
100.0 |
90.0 |
10.0 |
Second |
103.0 |
92.7 |
10.3 |
Third |
106.1 |
95.5 |
10.6 |
Fifth |
112.5 |
101.3 |
11.2 |
Tenth |
130.5 |
117.5 |
13.0 |
(These results do not differ too widely from what has been happening in recent
years in the United States.)
What this table illustrates is that total production in
Ruritania increases each year because of the net saving (and consequent
investment), and would not increase without it. The saving is used year after
year to increase the quantity and improve the quality of existing machinery or
other capital equipment, and so to increase the output of both consumption
and capital goods.
Each year there is a larger and larger "cake." Each year,
it is true, not all of the currently produced cake is consumed. But there is no
irrational or cumulative consumer restraint. For each year a larger and larger
cake is in fact consumed; until even at the end of five years (in our
illustration), the annual consumers' cake alone is equal to the combined
producers' and consumers' cakes of the first year. Moreover, the capital
equipment, the ability to produce goods, is now 12 percent greater than in the
first year. And by the tenth year the ability to produce goods is 30 percent
greater than in the first year; the total cake produced is 30 percent greater
than in the first year, and the consumers' cake alone is more than 17 percent
greater than the combined consumers' and producers' cakes in the first year.
No Allowances for Depreciation
There is a further point to be taken into account. Our table
is built on the assumption that there has been a net annual saving and
investment of 10 percent a year; but in order to achieve this Ruritania will
probably have to have a gross annual saving and investment of, say, twice
as much, or 20 percent, to cover the repairs, depreciation and deterioration
taking place every year in housing, roads, trucks, factories, equipment. This is
a consideration for which no room can be found in Keynes's simplistic and
mocking cake analogy. The same kind of reasoning which would make it seem silly
to save for new capital would also make it seem silly to save enough even to
replace old capital.
In a Keynesian world, in which saving was a sin,
production would go lower and lower, and the world would get poorer and poorer.
In the illustrative table I have by implication assumed the
long run equality of saving and investment. Keynes himself shifted his concepts
and definitions of both saving and investment repeatedly. In his General
Theory the discussion of their relation is hopelessly confused. At one point
(p. 74) he tells us that saving and investment are "necessarily equal" and
"merely different aspects of the same thing." At another point (p. 21) he is
telling us that they are "two essentially different activities" without even
a "nexus."
Produce, Save, Invest
Let us, putting all this aside, try to look at the matter
both simply and realistically. Let us define saving as an excess of production
over consumption; and let us define investment as the employment of this
unconsumed excess to create additional means of production. Then, though saving
and investment are not always necessarily equal, over the long run they
tend to equality.
New capital is formed by production combined with saving.
Before there can be a given amount of investment, there must be a preceding
equal amount of saving. Saving is the first half of the action necessary for
more investment. "To complete the act of forming capital it is of course
necessary to complement the negative factor of saving with the positive factor
of devoting the thing saved to a productive service.... [But] saving is an
indispensable condition precedent of the formation of capital." (12)
Keynes constantly deplored saving while praising investment,
persistently forgetting that the second was impossible without the first.
Of course it is most desirable economically that whatever is
saved should also be invested, and in addition invested prudently and wisely.
But in the modern world, investment follows or accompanies saving almost
automatically. Few people in the Western world today keep their money under the
floor boards. Even the poorer savers put their money out at interest in savings
banks; and those banks act as intermediaries to take care of the more direct
forms of investment. Even if a man keeps a relatively large sum in an inactive
checking deposit, the bank in which he keeps it, trying always to maximize its
profits or to minimize losses, seeks to keep itself "fully loaned up" -- that
is, with close to the minimum necessary cash reserves. If there is insufficient
demand at the time for commercial loans, the bank will buy Treasury bills or
notes. The result in the United States, for example, is that a bank in New York
or Chicago would normally lend out five-sixths of the "hoarder's" deposit;
and a "country bank" would lend out even more of it.
Of course, to repeat, a saver can do the most economic good,
both for himself and his community, if he invests most of his savings, and
invests them prudently and wisely. But -- contrary to the theories of the
mercantilists and the Keynesians -- even if he "hoards" his savings he may
often benefit both himself and the community and at least under normal
conditions do no harm.
To understand more clearly why this is so it may be
instructive to begin by distinguishing between three kinds of (or motives for)
saving, and three groups of savers -- roughly the poor, the middle class, and the
wealthy.
Rent-Day Saving
Let us call the most necessary kind, which even the poorest
must practice, "rent-day saving." Men buy and pay for things over different
time periods. They buy and pay for food, for the most part, daily. They pay rent
weekly or monthly. They buy major articles of clothing once or twice a year. A
man who earns $10 a day cannot afford to spend $10 a day on food and drink. He can spend on them, say, not more than $6 a day, and must put aside $4 a day
from which to pay out part at the end of the month for rent, light, and heat,
and another part for a winter overcoat at the end of six months, and so on. This
is the kind of saving necessary to ensure one's ability to spend throughout the
year. "Rent-day saving" can symbolize all the saving necessary to pay for
regularly recurrent and unavoidable living expenses. Obviously this kind of
saving, sustained only for weeks or a season, is not cumulative and can in no
circumstances be held responsible for business depressions. It is utter
irresponsibility to ridicule it.
Rainy-Day Saving Can't Cause Depression
The next kind of saving, which applies especially to the
middle classes, or moderately well off, is what we may call "rainy-day
saving." This is saving against such possible contingencies as loss of a job,
illness in the family, death of the breadwinner, or the like.
It is this "rainy-day saving" that the Keynesians
most deplore, and from which they fear the direst consequences. Yet even in
extreme cases it does not, except in very special cyclical circumstances, tend
to bring about any depression or economic slowdown.
Let us consider, for example, a society consisting entirely
of "hoarders" and "misers." They are hoarders and misers in
this sense: that they all assume they are going to live till 70 but will
be forced to retire at 60; and they want to have as much to spend in each of
their last ten years as in their 40 working years from 20 to 60. This means that
each family will save one-fifth of its annual income over 40 years in order to
have the same amount to spend in each of its final ten years.
We are deliberately assuming the extreme case, so let us
assume that the money saved is not invested in a business or in stocks or bonds,
is not even put in a savings bank, earns no interest, but is simply
"hoarded."
This of course would permit no economic improvement whatever,
but if it were the regular permanent way of life in that community, at least it
would not lead to a depression. The people who refrained from buying a
certain amount of consumers' goods and services would not be bidding up their
prices; they would simply be leaving them for others to buy. If this saving for
old age were the regular and expected way of life, and not some sudden
unanticipated mania for saving, the manufacturers of consumers' goods would not
have produced an oversupply to be left on their hands; the older people in their
seventh decade would in fact be spending more than similarly aged people in a
"spending" society, and the unspent savings of those who died would
revert to the spending stream. Over a long period, year by year, there would be
just as much spent as in a "spending" society.
Let us remember that money saved, in an evenly-rotating economy, where there is
neither monetary inflation nor deflation, does not go out of existence. Savings,
even when they are not invested in production goods, are merely deferred or
postponed spending. The money stays somewhere and is always finally spent.
In the long rim, in a society with a relatively stable ratio between hoarders
and spenders, savings are constantly coming back into the spending stream,
through old-age spending or through deaths, keeping the stream at an even flow.
What we are trying to understand is merely the effect of saving per se, and
not of sudden and unanticipated changes in spending and saving. Therefore
we are abstracting from the effects produced by unexpected changes in
spending and saving or changes in the stock of money. If even a heavy amount of
saving were the regular way of life in a community, the relative production and
prices of consumers' and producers' goods would already be adjusted to this. Of
course, if a depression sets in from some other cause, and the prices of
securities and of goods begin to fall, and people suddenly fear the loss of
their jobs, or a further fall in prices, this may lead to a massive and
unanticipated increase in saving (or more exactly in nonspending) and
this may of course intensify a depression already begun from other causes. But
depressions cannot be blamed on regular, predictable, anticipated saving.
Some readers may contend that I have not yet imagined the most extreme case
of saving -- a society, say, all the members of which perpetually save more than
half as much as they earn, and keep saving, not for old age, or for any
reasonable contingency, but simply because of a "religion" of saving. In
brief, these would be the cake nonconsumers of Keynes's satire. But such an
imaginary society involves a contradiction of assumptions. If the members of
that society intended always to live at their existing modest or even mean
level, why would they keep exerting themselves to produce more than they ever
expected to consume? That would be pathologic to the point of insanity. Keynes's
allegory of the extent of supposed nineteenth-century thrift was surely his own
hallucination.
Capitalistic Saving for Investment in Industry
We come finally to the third type of saving -- what we may call
"capitalistic" saving. This is saving that is put aside for investment
in industry -- either directly, or indirectly in the form of savings bank deposits.
It is saving that yields interest or profits. The saver hopes, in his old age or
even earlier, to live on the income yielded by his investments rather than by
consuming his saved capital.
This type of "capitalistic" saving was until
recently confined to the very rich. Indeed, even the very rich were not able to
take advantage of this type of saving until the modern development of banks and
corporations. As late as the beginning of the eighteenth century we hear of
London merchants on their retirement taking a chest of gold coin with them to
the country with the intention of gradually drawing on that hoard for the rest
of their lives. (12) Today the greater part even of the American middle classes, however, enjoy the advantage of capitalistic saving.
To sum up. Contrary to age-old prejudices, the wealth of the
rich is not the cause of the poverty of the poor, but helps to alleviate that
poverty. No matter whether it is their intention or not, almost anything that
the rich can legally do tends to help the poor. The spending of the rich gives
employment to the poor. But the saving of the rich, and their investment of
these savings in the means of production, gives just as much employment, and in
addition makes that employment constantly more productive and more highly paid,
while it also constantly increases and cheapens the production of necessities
and amenities for the masses.
The rich should of course be directly charitable in the
conventional sense, to people who because of illness, disability, or other
misfortune cannot take employment or earn enough. Conventional forms of private
charity should constantly be extended. But the most effective charity on the
part of the rich is to live simply, to avoid extravagance and ostentatious
display, and to save and invest so as to provide more people with increasingly
productive jobs, and to provide the masses with an ever-greater abundance of the
necessities and amenities of life.
Notes
* From the December 1970 issue of The Freeman.
1. Wealth of Nations (1776), Bk. IV, Ch. II.
2. Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. III.
3. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (Third Revised Edition, Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co., 1966), P. 648.
4. "The Greatest Economic Charity." Essay in symposium On Freedom and Free Enterprise, Mary Sennholz, ed. (Van Nostrand, 1956), P. 99.
5. James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson (Boston: Charles E. Lauriat
Co., 1925), Vol. II, P. 636.
6. (London: Smith, Elder, 1914; Second, Revised Edition. John Murray, 1931.)
7. Poverty and Waste, p. 139.
8. Vol. II, p. 208.
9. The Failure of the "New Economics" (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1959), pp. 40-43 and 355-362.
10. Notes on Malthus (Sraffa edition) P. 449 and P. 309.
11. Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Positive Theory of Capital. 1891 (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1959 ), pp. 104-118.
12. F. A. Hayek, Profits, Interest and Investment (London: George
Routledge, 1939), Pp. 162-163. See also the numerous cases mentioned in G. M.
Trevelyan's English Social History (David McCay, 1942).
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